This study empirically explores whether, and how, selected attributes of China's two-tier board system affect Chinese firms' performance and earnings informativeness. Using a database of 4,623 firm-year observations over the 1999 to 2003 period, we find some effects that mirror ones reported in non-Chinese settings, such as positive correlations between firm performance and the proportion of independent board of directors members (BoD) and the frequency of supervisory committee (SC) meetings; as well as positive correlations between earnings informativeness and the proportions of independent BoD and SC members. These exploratory findings provide impetus for further research in the Chinese setting.
Introduction and Research Objectives
In the U.S. and many developed countries, shareholders are represented by a board of directors (BoD) in monitoring and controlling firm management. The role of this corporate governance mechanism is to mitigate the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and management (Sloan, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the board performs both a management decision role and a decision control role. The former entails ensuring the efficient identification and selection of investment projects, thus directly affecting firm performance. The control role aims to restrain managers' latitude to derive excessive personal benefits at the expense of the firm, and indirectly affects firm performance via preserving the integrity of assets and external reporting. Numerous studies in Western settings have suggested that both firm performance and the informativeness of reported earnings are affected by BoD attributes such as the proportion of outside board members, board size, frequency of board meetings and share ownership by members of the board Weisbach, 1991, 2003; Yermack, 1996 Yermack, , 2004 Vafeas, 1999 Vafeas, , 2005 Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Klein, 2002; Srinivasan, 2005) .
In the case of China, listed firms are required to have both a BoD and a supervisory committee (SC), with the latter being charged with overseeing both the BoD and firm management. While conceptually having a two-tier governance structure should enhance outsiders' oversight over management, whether this outcome would hold in the case of Chinese firms is an open question. The reason is that the incentives and ability of internal governance bodies to control management are not independent of external disciplining devices, including the legal infrastructure, shareholder activism, executive compensation, external auditing, and the takeover market (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Sundaramurthy and Mahoney, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002) . Since property rights protection and related market mechanisms are relatively underdeveloped in China, Chinese firms' BoDs and SCs may not have the effects on performance and earnings informativeness observed in Western settings. The objective of this study is to provide exploratory evidence on this question. In addition to considering BoD and SC attributes suggested by the extant literature, our study also explores potential interplay between the two tiers, as well as the effects of ownership structure and external factors like audit quality. A comparison is also made of the periods before and after 2002, when the Chinese authorities significantly expanded the responsibilities and authority of the BoD and SC.
Board of Directors Attributes, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
A large number of studies have investigated the relationship between BoD characteristics and firm performance (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 for an overview). The board characteristics most often tested are composition (e.g. mix of inside/outside directors), size, the intensity of activities, and inside ownership. Relating to board composition, it is widely hypothesized that due to their independence from firm management, outside/independent (i.e. non-employee) directors would be more effective than inside members in monitoring and controlling management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995; Klein, 1998, Bhagat and Black, 1999; Yermack, 2004) .
To date, studies on the performance effects of board composition have yielded mixed results. While Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found a favorable stock price reaction to announced appointments of additional outside directors, Beasley (1996) observed a negative relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and the likelihood of fraud. Several other studies found no significant link between outside directors or board composition and firm performance, as measured by market-to-book value, the price/earnings ratio, operating margin, return on assets, sales per employee, The board was tasked with overseeing the formulation of long-term corporate strategies and development plans, supervising major investment decisions, and determining the appointment, remuneration and appraisal of the CEO. These responsibilities and authority are quite similar to those of U.S. companies' corporate boards, except that the Chinese firms' boards were not empowered to appoint external auditors.
1 The SC is accorded a different set of due diligent powers and responsibilities: to call shareholders' meetings; review the financial position and transactions of the company; supervise the directors' and senior managers' compliance with the laws, regulations and company bylaws; correct any illegal and unethical behaviors which may harm the interests of the firm; and to discharge any duties as designated by the shareholders and in the bylaws.
2 Subsequent to the enactment of the Corporate Law, the power to regulate China's securities markets was delegated to the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The Commission has promulgated further measures in 2002 which aimed at strengthening corporate governance practices, with many of the measures using the pattern of the OECD's Code of Practices. Despite these initiatives, both the scope and enforcement of regulations are still well short of those in the advanced economies, including the openness of banking/finance and the protection of property rights (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005) . In particular, the legal enforcement of claims by shareholders against directors and management for losses due to false information disclosure is still weak and reform is just getting started. 
Research Propositions
Given the similarities between the responsibilities and authority accorded to Chinese firms' internal governance mechanisms and their Western counterparts, it is not unreasonable to expect that they would have similar performance and earnings informativeness effects. Monitoring by the SC should augment the BoD's diligence and integrity. In addition, the SC's direct oversight over management could have additional effects of its own. Such expectations, however, must be tempered by considering the broader context in which Chinese firms' BoDs and SCs operate. Two characteristics of listed Chinese firms are particularly relevant in this regard. First, most of these firms had been carved out from state -owned enterprises and are mandated to have three separate classes of ownership shares-state-owned shares are held by the central government, government ministries, or provincial and municipal governments. These shares are prohibited from trading publicly. Institutional shares are owned by separate legal entities. Finally, shares issued to individuals can be further classified into ones restricted to domestic trading by Chinese citizens ("A-shares"), and ones that can be sold to 1 The Corporate Law specified that members of the board should be elected in the shareholders' meeting for renewable three-year terms. Members of management, including the CEO, are allowed to serve on the board.
2 SC members were also given the right to attend board meetings for the discharge of its statutory duties, but not the authority to nominate or dismiss the BoD. In terms of size, the SC has to contain at least three elected representatives of shareholders and employees (non-managerial personnel), who hold office for renewable three-year terms. Current members of the BoD and management are precluded from membership.
3 An Ordinance which gave shareholders the right to take legal action against the board of directors and managers for any loss resulting from false information disclosure was only first proposed in 2003. foreign individuals and entities ("B-shares"). In addition to having both A-and B-shares, some Chinese firms are also listed on the Hong Kong and foreign stock exchanges. On the whole, however, government agencies tend to be the dominant owners. 4 Taken together, the limited transferability of shares and the dominance of state ownership suggest that external governance mechanisms that are active in the more developed economies, such as takeovers, are less likely to affect Chinese firms' managers or motivate efforts by their BoD and SC members to increase performance and earnings informativeness. First, governmental shareholders often have access to inside information (DeFond, Hung and Trezevant, 2004) , and are less likely to be concerned with the informativeness of firms' financial reports. They also tend to have objectives that deviate from profitability. Governmental shareholders may also seek to install BoD and SC members who are sympathetic to their agenda. This departure from increasing firm performance may be further buttressed by the requirement that the SC contain representatives of the non-management employees, who may favor diverting resources from shareholders to their cohorts. The incentives of BoD and SC members to increase firm performance and earnings informativeness may be further reduced by the lack of rewards for establishing reputations as effective shareholder representatives, given that China's market for the services of board and SC members is still in an early stage of development. This is not to suggest that non-state owners would have no effect. Such owners do reap personal gains from firm ownership and as such, they are likely to desire improved firm performance. Their relative lack of access to inside information also implies that they have more to gain from increasing financial report informativeness. Since influencing the selection and actions of BoD and SC members takes resources, larger non-state shareholders are more capable of such undertakings. Thus, we expect the emphasis on firm performance and earnings informativeness to increase with the concentration of non-state ownership. We also expect foreign ownership to increase pressures for performance and earnings informativeness. Due to their lack of geographical proximity, foreign shareholders are more likely than domestic investors to demand (directly or via the pricing of shares) more stringent oversight of management. In addition, firms issuing foreign shares (B-and H-shares) are required to issue information based on the International Accounting Standards (IAS) together with a summary of reconciliations between the local and IAS figures. In summary, Chinese firms' BoDs and SCs have the potential to affect performance and earnings informativeness in a manner similar to that observed in the U.S. and other developed economies. However, selected features of the Chinese setting may negate or moderate these effects at the same time that additional variables may come into play. Empirical evidence on these relationships can be informative to both Chinese policymakers and investors in Chinese companies, yet it is lacking in the extant literature. Hence, we specify the following two propositions based largely on the extant (non-Chinese) literature reviewed earlier and supplement these with variables that are relatively unique to the Chinese setting.
Proposition 1:
Performance is higher for listed Chinese firms with more concentrated non-state ownership, foreign ownership, boards of directors and supervisory committees that have higher proportions of independent members, more frequent meetings, smaller sizes, and higher share ownership, and whose CEOs do not serve as chairman of the board.
Proposition 2:
Earnings informativeness is higher for listed Chinese firms with more concentrated non-state ownership, foreign ownership, boards of directors and supervisory committees that have higher proportions of independent members, more frequent meetings, smaller sizes, and higher share ownership, and whose CEOs do not serve as chairman of the board.
Research Method

Sample Selection
To exercise some control over extraneous factors, the sample was selected from listed Chinese companies under the General Industry classification. The numbers of General Industry listed companies in the five years of 1999 to 2003 are 924, 1,061, 1,136, 1,198, and 1,258, respectively. 5 This selection process yielded a total of 5,577 firm-year observations for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. To control for the effects of extreme values, we removed observations that are (1) in the top and bottom onehalf percent of book value-to-market value, (2) in the top one-half percent of firms with the most extreme values of one-time items as a percent of income, and (3) identified as extreme outliers in the regression. This process yielded a final sample of 4,623 firm-year observations, which were used in all of our hypothesis tests.
The Effects of Two-tier Board System and Ownership Structure on Firm Performance
The effect of the two-tier board system and ownership structure on firm performance was tested with a multiple regression which included nine control variables. Leverage (LEVERAGE) was included because higher proportions of debt in the capital structure may reduce the cash flow available for discretionary use by management, thereby reducing the chances of managerial inefficiency (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986) . However, the increased burden of fixed interest payments may also hamper performance, while increasing the incentives for accounting manipulations to satisfy debt covenants. Size (SIZE) was included because larger companies generally enjoy economies of scale (Singh and Davidson, 2003) , though agency costs may also increase with firm size (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . A proxy for growth (GROWTH) was included because companies with higher growth tend to have higher market valuation. We also included a dummy variable for identifying the auditor (AUDITOR) because prior research (e.g. DeFond, Wong and Li, 1999; Chen, Chen and Su, 2001 ) had found evidence of quality differentiation among Chinese auditors. Following these earlier studies, we differentiated between the ten auditors with the largest market shares and the rest. A second dummy variable related to whether the audit opinion was qualified (OPINION). This was motivated by previous research that had found qualified audit opinions to convey adverse information to the market (e.g. Chow and Rice, 1982) .
Prior studies of earnings management suggest that managers are more likely to manipulate earnings prior to major external financing activities. In China, a listed company is precluded from rights issues unless it maintains a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 6% for three consecutive years, with the average ROE over these three years being no less than 10%. To account for the effects of this requirement, we included a dummy variable (SEO) to reflect such equity offering activities. Another special delisting mechanism introduced by CSRC since 1998 might also affect Chinese firms' management incentives. A firm with two consecutive years of negative net profits is designated as a ST (special treatment) firm. If a ST firm fails to become profitable in the third year, it is designated a PT (particular transfer) firm and entered into delisting proceedings. We therefore included a dummy variable (PT) to control for the effects of ST and PT status on performance and earnings management incentives. Finally, since performance may vary across industries, dummy variables (INDUSTRY) were included to control for these effects. Since the data were pooled over a five-year period, we used the fixed effects panel data analysis method to test for temporal instability in the regression coefficients for the following model:
where:
M/B = Market value over book value of owners' equity, BOARDI = The proportion of independent board members, BOARDS = Proportion of shares owned by members of the board, MEETB = Number of board meetings for the year, BOARDN = Membership size of the board of directors, DUAL = 0/1 variable, 1 = CEO also serves as chairman of the board, 0 otherwise, SUPERI = The proportion of independent supervisory committee members,
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104 SUPERS = Proportion of shares owned by members of the supervisory committee, MEETS = Number of supervisory committee meetings for the year, SUPERN = Membership size of the supervisory committee, TOP = The proportion of shares owned by the largest non-state shareholders, computed as the ownership of the ten largest shareholders net of the proportion of state-owned shares, FORN = 0/1 variable, 1 = company also has B-and/or H-shares, 0 otherwise, LEVERAGE = Ratio of long-term debt to total assets, SIZE = Total assets, GROWTH = The percentage change in sales from year t-1 to t, AUDITOR = 0/1 variable, 1 = auditor is one of the ten largest, 0 otherwise, PT = 0/1 variable, 1 = a firm is "ST" or "PT" in year t, 0 otherwise, SEO = 0/1 variable, 1 = a firm issues new equity in year t+1 or t+2, 0 otherwise, OPINION = 0/1 variable, 1 = a firm's auditor opinion is unqualified in year t-1, 0 otherwise, SH = 0/1 variable, 1 = a firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 0 otherwise.
Our use of market to book value of equity as a performance measure is based on an extensive prior literature (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Stulz, 1988) . Also, we defined independent members of the BoD and SC as non-paid members to distinguish them from the insiders who normally receive remuneration for serving on these bodies. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression model. The sample firms have an average ratio of market to book value of equity of 4.564, and an average annual stock return (adjusted for dividends and stock splits) of -4.30%. Both the mean and median earnings per share are Renminbi (RMB) 0.169. (US$1 = RMB8.2, approximately.)
Relating to the independent variables, the median BoD has nine directors and the median percentage of independent directors is 45.10%. During the sample period, the boards in our sample held an average of six meetings per year. The median SC membership size is five members, with 41% being independent members. On average, the SCs met 3.29 times per year. These characteristics of the BoD and SC suggest that in many of the firms, they do have the potential to play an active role in overseeing management. Turning to the ownership variables, the proxy for concentration of nonstate ownership, TOP, has a median of 22%. The magnitude of this variable suggests that there is potential for the largest non-state owners to have an impact on management. In contrast, shareholdings by members of the BoD and SC are quite insignificant. The average BoD and SC member only owned 0.090% and 0.011%, respectively, of his/her firm's shares. Finally, only 10.5% of the boards are chaired by the CEO, and less than 1% of the sample had both A-shares and B-or H-shares. Table 2 presents the correlations among the variables, with Pearson correlations under the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. Many of the correlations are significant at the p = 0.05 level, though most are small in absolute value. There are weak relationships between the number of board meetings and board size as well as between SC size and board size. Table 2 also indicates a modest positive correlation between the percentages of independent directors and independent SC members. Also, the percentage of non-state shareholding is positively related to the percentage of independent board members. And as the percentage of independent board members increases, the likelihood that the board is chaired by the CEO decreases. The likelihood of the board being chaired by the CEO is also smaller for the larger companies. Finally, firm size is positively related to both board size and SC size. Firm performance is positively correlated with the percentages of independent board and SC members, inversely associated with the frequency of board meetings, and negatively correlated with board and SC size. Leverage and firm size are inversely related to firm performance. Table 2 Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) Correlation Matrix for Variables used in the Tests Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions.
* denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
108 Table 3 reports the regression results in Column A. Log transformations were performed on MEETB, MEETS, BOARDN, SUPERN and SIZE to allow for non-linear relationships. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was within acceptable levels, consistent with limited, if any, multi-collinearity problems. Column A shows that seven of the control variables are significantly related to firm performance: LEVERAGE (positive), SIZE (negative), GROWTH (positive), PT (positive), SEO (positive), OPINION (positive), and SH (positive). By and large, the directions of these relationships are consistent with prior findings from non-Chinese settings, though the positive coefficient for PT (indicating firms with sub-par earnings performance) poses a puzzle. More important, five of the eleven coefficients for the governance and ownership variables are statistically significant. Four of these are consistent with our expectation of how governance and ownership structure may affect firm performance: the proportion of independent board directors (BOARDI, positive), frequency of SC meetings (MEETS, positive), the concentration of non-state ownership (TOP, positive), and the existence of foreign ownership (FORN, positive). In contrast, the negative coefficient for BOARDS suggests that greater ownership by BoD members is associated with lower, rather than higher, firm performance.
Table 3 Regression of Market-to-book Value on Governance Variables, Ownership Attributes and Control Variables (p values in parentheses)
Predicted Sign Table 3 . There are very few differences either between these Columns, or between them and Column A. The most notable finding is that the positive effect of the number of SC meetings (MEETS) is only significant in the post-Code period. Overall, these results suggest that the Chinese authorities' recent initiatives have buttressed somewhat, but not fundamentally changed, the effects of Chinese firms' internal governance mechanisms.
Five other tests were performed to gain further insights and to assess the findings' robustness. First, given the SC's oversight over the BoD, there is potential for its effects to be manifest through the BoD. We explored this possibility by including interaction terms between all pairs of the SC-and BoD-related variables. None of these terms was statistically significant and BOARDI, BOARDS, and MEETS retained their significant coefficients. Second, since non-management employees are required to be part of the SC, we ran additional regressions to test the effect on firm performance (and informativeness of reported earnings in the following section) of employee representation on the SC. The SC attributes tested were the number and proportion of non-management employee SC members. Neither measure was significant. Third, since the state is often the largest shareholder in Chinese listed companies, we replicated all the regressions by replacing TOP (which had a significant positive coefficient) with the state's shareholding percentage. The state variable had a negative and statistically significant coefficient for firm performance, which is consistent with claims that the state often pursues objectives other than profitability. Fourth, since the residual of a given firm may be correlated across years for a given firm and the residuals of a given year may be correlated across firms, we followed Peterson (2005) in estimating our coefficients using clustered standard errors to account for the dependence in the residuals. The results were not Stella Cho and Oliver M. Rui Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 95-118 110 qualitatively different from those in the mean regressions. Finally, we conducted tests for possible endogeneity in the governance and performance relationship. The issue at hand is whether corporate governance leads to firm performance, or firm performance leads to a particular governance structure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . Corporate governance theory typically only deals with univariate rather than multivariate relationships, and predictions are for one mechanism only. Those mechanisms are mostly assumed to be exogenous. This approach is problematic if real world mechanisms are substitute or complementary ways of reducing agency costs. Previous studies have suggested two ways to remedy the problem: using lagged performance measures or two-stage least squares (2SLS). We estimated equation (1) using 2SLS as well as one-year lagged performance measures. The results are qualitatively consistent with those reported above.
The Effects of Two-tier Board System and Ownership Structure on Earnings Informativeness
Following prior research, we operationalize earnings informativeness with the earnings-returns relationship (Fan and Wong, 2002; Teoh and Wong, 1993; Choi and Jeter, 1992) . The second research proposition was tested using pooled cross-sectional regression: 
where R = buy-and-hold stock return from January to December of year t, EARN = earnings per share, and the remaining variables are as previously defined. Several aspects of equation (2) are worthy of note. First, the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of total assets (M/B) is included to help control for the effects of growth, as growth opportunities are likely to be positively associated with future earnings levels and/or earnings persistence (Collins and Kothari, 1989) . Second, LEVERAGE plays a somewhat different role than it does in equation (1), though its net impact remains indeterminate. Leverage can proxy for the riskiness of debt or default risk (Dhaliwal, Lee and Fargher, 1991) . Highly leveraged firms tend to have higher risk, and this can weaken their earnings-return relationships. But leverage can also proxy for a firm's investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts, 1992) , and mature firms with low growth opportunities generally have high leverage and are more likely to have informative earnings. Third, in addition to identifying the auditor (AUDITOR), whether the auditor opinion is qualified (OPINION) can also proxy for accounting quality. Choi and Jeter (1992) found that audit qualifications reduce the market's responsiveness to earnings announcements by changing the market's perception of earnings noise or the persistence of earnings, or both. Fourth, earnings management research has reported evidence that managers tend to manage earnings prior to some major external financing activities. In our study, PT and SEO reflect events that can have similar incentive effects. Finally, SIZE helps to control for other missing factors that may affect the earningsreturn relationship. Table 4 presents the results from regression equation (2). Column A is based on the entire 1999 period, while Columns B and C relate to 1999 and 2002 , respectively. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for EARN indicates that on average, stock returns are positively related to reported earnings. Column A shows that all of the control variables, except for PT, have statistically significant coefficients. Among the governance and ownership variables, significant main effects are found for BOARDI, MEETB, SUPERI, SUPERN, and FORN. Of these, the positive coefficient for BOARDI and the negative one for BOARDN are consistent with expectations from the extant (non-Chinese) literature. However, the negative coefficients for number of BoD meetings (MEETB) and percentage of independent SC members (SUPERI), and positive coefficient for SC size (SUPERN) suggest that, as in the case of performance, Chinese firms' internal governance mechanisms may play a different role in financial reporting as compared to their counterparts in other economies. Focusing next on the interaction terms between reported earnings and the governance/ownership variables, only three out of the nine are statistically significant. These are, respectively, the ones involving BOARDN, SUPERI, and MEETS. Both larger board sizes and more frequent meetings by the SC are associated with lower responsiveness of security returns to reported earnings. While the former is consistent with the implications of the extant literature, the latter is in the opposite direction. The positive interaction term for the percentage of independent SC members, on the other hand, is consistent with the expectation that such members can help to control earnings management. All in all, however, the results do not suggest strong effects from the two tiers of Chinese firms' internal governance structures. A comparison of Columns B and C yield substantially the same inferences. Accounting & Economics 16 (2009) 95-118 113 Two further tests were performed to assess whether the results were artifacts of our experimental design choices. First, simultaneous equations models estimated via twostage least squares were used to control for the endogeneity of board structure. The conclusions derived from these tests are similar to those shown in Table 4 . Second, we repeated our analyses by replacing raw stock returns with industry-adjusted stock returns, and each firm's earnings with industry-adjusted earnings. The former entailed deducting from each firm's annual stock return the median annual return of its industry. The latter involved deducting from each firm's operating profit the median value for its industry. (The INDUSTRY dummies were omitted from the regression given this industry-based adjustment.) The regression results from using these alternative specifications of RETURN and EARN were very similar to those shown in Table 4 and thus they are not separately reported. Overall, then, the results in Table 4 are quite robust to issues of endogeneity, variable definitions and measurements.
Summary and Discussion
Findings based on 4,623 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2003 indicate that both tiers of Chinese firms' internal governance structures-the BoD and SC-have some effects on both firm performance and earnings informativeness. While only a subset of the governance attributes suggested by prior research in non-Chinese settings were significant, some of the effects were directionally consistent with predictions based on this literature. In the case of firm performance, the percentage of independent BoD members and the frequency of SC meetings had the expected positive effects. External factors, in particular the concentration of non-state ownership and the presence of foreign shareholders, were also positively related to firm performance. For earnings informativeness, positive effects were found for the percentages of independent BoD and SC members, membership size of the SC, as well as the presence of foreign shareholders. A comparison between 1999-2001 and 2002-2003 also provided some evidence to suggest that regulators' expansion of the BoD's and SC's powers did increase, somewhat, the effects of these governance bodies. Thus, despite reasons to question whether Chinese firms' internal governance bodies would have sufficient incentives or ability to discipline management, these bodies do play such a role. As such, attention to the BoD's and SC's statutory powers would seem to be warranted. The findings further suggest that Chinese firm managers are susceptible to the influences of capital market participants. At the same time, however, the findings strongly caution against the indiscriminate application of theories and expectations based on non-Chinese settings. Support for this caveat comes from three aspects of the findings. First is the lack of effects from variables that had been found to be significant in other settings, such as the CEO's occupancy of the BoD chairmanship. Second, some effects of the Chinese firms' BoD and SC attributes are opposite in direction from expectations based on the non-Chinese literature. Finally, some governance variables are found to have different effects on firm performance versus earnings informativeness. In particular, whereas the frequency of SC meetings was positively related to firm performance, it was negatively related to the reaction of stock returns to reported earnings. Also, the frequency of BoD meetings, BoD size, and proportion of independent SC members are significantly related to earnings informativeness, but all have non-significant correlations with firm performance. Findings like these suggest that, while theories and findings from nonChinese settings do provide a useful point of departure for understanding corporate governance relationships and effect in China, they are far from adequate for unearthing the complexities and intricacies of this phenomenon. For example, can it be that the different relations of the percentage of independent BoD members with firm performance (positive and significant) and earnings informativeness (non-significant) reflect different degrees of BoD emphasis or effectiveness in monitoring these aspects of firm operations? Or is this a reflection of Chinese investors' use of financial reports? Questions like these relate to the "hows" and "whys" behind phenomena, and addressing them will require going beyond examining cross-sectional differences in effects. To dig deeper into understanding the relationships and effects, other modes of investigations such as in-depth interviews or field studies are warranted.
